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kmk4@psu.edu1. Introduction
While there is a large body of work on the eﬀects of international labor mobility,
and on the brain drain, see for example Bhagwati (1976) and Hamada (1975),
there has been relatively little written on how implementation and diﬀerences in
implementation aﬀect migration patterns and rents. There are major diﬀerences
between countries in the extent of migration and in the way that migration policies
are implemented. Countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting
of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates,
have fairly high proportions of migrant workers. They comprise approximately 55
percent of the labor force in Bahrain, 65-70 percent of the labor force in Oman
and Saudi Arabia, and 85-90 percent in Kuwait, Qatar, and in the United Arab
Emirates. One of the most commonly adopted migration policies is the allocation
of migrant work permits to domestic ￿rms, where migrant labor must be sponsored
by a ￿rm in the host country. These permits are only good for a short time period,
anywhere from six months up to two years and the sponsorship is usually non-
transferable. This means that once a migrant worker has entered the country to
work for a ￿rm they must leave the country and reapply to be able to work for
ad i ﬀerent ￿rm. On the other hand, in many western countries, the prerequisites
for temporary or permanent migration are capital investment of a suitable sum in
the host country, having close relatives who are citizens, or having needed skills.
In most cases, the permit is with the migrant, not the employer, and it is often
permanent, not temporary.
In this paper we compare the eﬀects of transferable permits to ones which are
allocated to ￿rms who cannot trade them. The latter is similar to the way labor
markets work in the GCC countries. For this reason we provide some background
on these countries next.
1.1. Some Features of Labor Markets in GCC Countries
In the aftermath of the oil price increases of 1973 and 1974 severe labor shortages
quickly developed in most of the GCC countries. The labor shortages were for
both skilled and unskilled labor. With increasing government expenditures, es-
pecially the implementation of large public infrastructure projects, there was an
increased demand for both technical and professional skills as well as blue-collar la-
bor. Also, the many-fold increase in personal incomes led to an immediate demand
for labor in the household service sectors. The labor shortage was ameliorated by
an in￿ux of foreign labor arriving mostly from other Middle Eastern countries.
2Initially, migrant labor was either not regulated or the existing migration quotas
were not strictly enforced in most of the GCC countries.
In the 1980￿s and 1990￿s real wages of domestic workers stagnated and popu-
lation growth rates increased to over four percent in several GCC countries. This
led to migrant labor policies becoming increasingly stringent in an eﬀort to pro-
tect domestic jobs and wages. Today, despite stricter permit regulations, demand
for migrant labor remains high. One of the major factors in￿uencing this contin-
uing demand for migrant labor is the attitude of GCC nationals towards private
sector jobs. The wealth of the oil boom was partially distributed to nationals in
the form of guaranteed government jobs at in￿ated wages with generous bene￿t
packages. These bene￿ts often meet or even exceed the base salary. For example,
paid leave and shorter working hours allow employees to conduct private business
after working hours. Thus the government has become the employer of ￿rst and
last resort. The extent of this can be seen in Kuwait, where over 90 percent of the
national labor force is employed in the public sector. This gives nationals very
high reservation wages and very little incentive to educate themselves in skills
that are in demand by the private sector. Public subsidization of education for
nationals, even to the point of making education free, has not curbed the short-
age of skilled domestic workers. On the demand side, legislation that makes it
diﬃcult to ￿re a national working in the private sector makes it less attractive to
hire locals. In response to growing unemployment, policies that restrict the use of
migrant labor or encourage the use of domestic workers have been implemented.
These are politically more popular than structural reform of the labor market.
However, one only has to look at the steadily rising unemployment ￿gures to see
that these restrictive migration policies are not working. Unemployment rates are
already far higher than anything oﬃcially admitted and unoﬃcial estimates range
from 20% in Oman and 25% in Saudi Arabia up to 30% in Bahrain.1
There is little work in the literature that analyzes implementation diﬀerences
of migration policies.2 In this paper we deal with one such diﬀerence: namely the
implication, in the short run, of allocating migration permits to ￿rms in an exoge-
nous manner and making them non-transferable. Krishna and Tan (1999) take
ad i ﬀerent approach where they compare transferability and non-transferability
of licenses with uncertainty of license prices. They consider a two period model
where license purchases are chosen in the ￿rst period and the value of the license
1The Economist, Apr 12, 1997.
2The closest paper to ours is Djajic (1989) who uses the same framework to look at traditional
questions such as the eﬀects of migration on trade ￿ows.
3is realized in the second period. They show that the price of a license is higher
under non transferability if the quota is less restrictive than a given level and vice
versa otherwise. In contrast, since there is no uncertainty in our model, and as
licenses are allocated based on historical shares and political connections, we take
the allocation of licenses as given and look at the eﬀects of transferability and
non-transferability on the distribution of license rents.
Domestic and foreign eﬀective labor may be perfect substitutes or imperfect
substitutes. We allow workers within each country to be of diﬀering abilities where
each ability type provides a certain amount of eﬀective labor. These abilities are
assumed to be observable by ￿rms. In our setting this is equivalent to assuming
that ￿rms can oﬀer a piece rate wage. If licenses are sold in a competitive market,
the owner of the license obtains the license rents and the highest skilled workers
from abroad enter the domestic country. The same results are obtained when
licenses are initially allocated to ￿rms and the licenses are transferable. Migrants,
other than the marginal ones, are better oﬀ migrating so that potential license
rents are shared.
What if licenses are allocated to ￿rms and are not transferable? If domestic
and foreign labor are homogeneous and the allocation of licenses is such that
all ￿rms employ both domestic and foreign labor in equilibrium, then all ￿rms
have the same marginal product of eﬀective labor which is equal to the domestic
wage. Firms with more licenses merely reap more rents. In this case there is
no diﬀerence in the distribution of licenses rents from the transferable case and
no eﬃciency loss. However, if the allocation of licenses is severely distorted, so
that some ￿r m se m p l o yo n l yf o r e i g nl a b o r ,then there will be an eﬃciency loss
if the marginal product of labor is not equalized across all ￿rms. We show that
￿rms with less binding, or larger allocations of licenses will oﬀer employment to
lower quality migrants. However, economy-wide the same migrant labor types
enter as would have had the licenses been transferable. Thus, one might ask what
is the eﬀect of distorted non-transferable licenses on the domestic economy? In
addition to the ineﬃciency caused by ￿rms having diﬀerent marginal products
of eﬀective labor, and hence not being on the production possibility frontier, we
show that this will reduce the share of migration rents to migrant workers given
certain conditions on the production function. If domestic and foreign labor are
imperfectly substitutable, then the outcome is similar to that in the distorted
homogeneous labor case.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we set up our basic model where domestic
and foreign labor are perfect substitutes. We ￿rst look at transferable licenses
4so that marginal products of eﬀective labor are equalized across ￿rms. We then
look at non-transferable licenses where the marginal products of eﬀective labor
need not be equalized across ￿rms, and ￿nally, at the many ￿rm case. In Section
3 we extend our analysis to the case with imperfect labor substitutes. Section 4
contains some ￿nal thoughts.
2. Perfect Substitutes
There are two countries, domestic and foreign. There are a large number of
identical ￿rms in the domestic country with three factors of production, capital,
domestic eﬀective labor and foreign eﬀective labor. There is a single good pro-
duced using the factors of production, which has a price of unity. Let domestic
and foreign wages per eﬀective unit of labor be represented by w, w∗.W ea s s u m e
that the foreign country is large so that its wage is ￿xed. The transportation
costs of migration are assumed to be zero. The equilibrium domestic wage per
eﬀective labor unit, w, is determined in a general equilibrium framework where
the equilibrium wage is a function of the total number of licenses allocated in the
economy.
Workers are distributed over a continuum of ability types, θ ∈ [0,1]. One
unit of type θ labor is equivalent to θ units of eﬀective labor. The function g(θ)
represents the density function over labor types at home and abroad, while N
and N∗ denote the population size of the domestic and foreign countries. For
simplicity, we assume that g(θ) is uniform.
In order to model the GCC migrant labor market more closely, we assume
that migration permits are allocated to ￿rms in the domestic country. Each ￿rm
is initially allocated Qi licenses. The total migration licenses allocated in the
economy is Q =
P
i
Qi. Each worker must have a migration permit to enter and
work in the domestic country.
2.1. Transferable Licenses
The symmetric two ￿rm model where foreign and domestic labor are perfectly
substitutable is illustrated in Figure 1. The total eﬀective labor in the domestic
economy from domestic and migrant workers is measured on the horizontal axis,
where E is the size of the domestic labor force and E∗ = N∗ R 1
θ θg(θ)dθ is the
size of the migrant labor force given that Q licenses are allocated in the economy










and that θ is the marginal migrant worker that chooses to work in the domestic
country. The marginal product of eﬀective labor of each ￿rm is measured on the
vertical axis. We will show that ￿rms will use the same amount of eﬀective labor,
e, if licenses are transferable.
The competitive equilibrium can be constructed assuming that ￿rms can iden-
tify foreign labor by its type and oﬀer a wage schedule, W(θ), over labor types.
To hire a migrant worker ￿rms also incur the cost of either buying a license at
the market price or forgoing the bene￿t of selling the license to another ￿rm.
The cost of hiring a migrant worker thus takes the form W(θ)+L, where W(θ)
is the wage oﬀered for each ability type and L is the market price of a license.3
The equilibrium wage schedule oﬀered to migrant workers must have the following
properties.
1. Indiﬀerence: A ￿rm must be equally well oﬀ whichever type of labor it ends
up hiring. If this was not the case, the preferred workers would have their wages
bid up. This implies that each ￿rm must have the same cost per eﬀective unit of
labor independent of which skill type it hires.







= w for all θ,θ
0 that are hired by the ￿rms. (1)
where w i st h ed o m e s t i cw a g ep e ru n i to fe ﬀective labor. A ￿rm which oﬀers
3Since each license allows the ￿rm to hire one worker rather than one eﬀective labor unit,
the license price does not depend on the type of the worker.














a higher (lower) wage than the going one will have excess supply (demand) so
all ￿rms must oﬀe rt h es a m ee ﬀective wage. Hence the wage schedule oﬀered to
migrant workers will be,
W(θ)=wθ − L. (2)
I nF i g u r e2 ,t h ed o m e s t i cw a g es c h e d u l ei sg i v e nb yt h el i n e0 w and the foreign
wage schedule is given by the line 0w∗, where skill types are measured on the hor-
izontal axis and wages received are measured on the vertical axis. The equilibrium
wage schedule oﬀered to migrant workers, W(θ), is just the domestic wage sched-
ule shifted down by the value of a migration license, L, which is a function of the
total license allocation. The marginal migrant worker, θ, is determined so that
only Q workers enter. For migration to exist it must be that w>w ∗.S i n c et h e
diﬀerence in wages from migrating is increasing in the productivity of a worker,
only the highest types will migrate. Potential rents are shared between domestic
￿rms and migrant workers as migrants, other than the marginal ones, are better
oﬀ migrating than not.
What is the equilibrium license price L? Since the marginal migrant worker,
θ, will be indiﬀerent between migrating and receiving a wage of wθ − L or not
migrating and receiving w∗θ, this gives us,
L =[ w − w
∗]θ. (3)
Then θ, is determined by the constraint on the number of licenses, Q, allocated



















2. Market Clearing: Domestic wages are such that the horizontal sum of the
marginal value product of eﬀective labor across all ￿r m se q u a l st o t a le ﬀective labor
supply E + E∗. W ea s s u m et h a t￿rms are symmetric other than their license
allocations and have a ￿xed factor K so that labor has diminishing marginal
product. If license are transferable, or they are not transferable but all ￿rms are
willing to hire some domestic labor, then all ￿rms must be indiﬀerent between
hiring domestic and foreign labor and w must be the marginal value product of
an eﬀective unit of foreign labor as well. The license price can be interpreted as
the shadow bene￿t of a license and ￿rms with more licenses have more rents. In
equilibrium all ￿rms oﬀer the same wage per eﬀective unit of labor, employ the
same amount of eﬀective labor denoted by ET
i = E+E∗
M , where M is the number
of ￿rms, and employ the average quality of migrant labor that is hired in the
domestic country.
2.2. Non-transferable Licenses
Why use non-transferable migration licenses in GCC countries? Clearly this mi-
gration policy is ineﬃcient from a labor allocation perspective. However, with
non-transferable licenses, under certain conditions, ￿rms oﬀer a wage schedule in
equilibrium that gives them a greater portion of the license rents from migration!
Since licenses are often allocated in GCC countries on the basis of political ties,
distorted license allocations are common. For example, in Kuwait, once a ￿rm
is licensed to operate it must apply to the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and Labor
for a certain allocation of workers where this allocation is based on an inspection
by staﬀ of the Ministry. Political connections play a large role in the number of
licenses that each ￿rm is allocated. In addition, the percentage of the national








































































































labor force that is employed in the private sector of GCC countries is usually very
small, in Kuwait 90 percent of the labor force in the private sector are migrant
workers, so the allocation of licenses does not necessarily need to be very skewed
in order for at least one ￿rm to hire only migrant labor.
Firms will not use the same amount of eﬀective labor in production if their
marginal products of eﬀective labor are not the same. What license allocation
will lead to a diﬀerence in the marginal products of eﬀective labor? With perfect
substitutability of domestic and migrant labor the marginal product of eﬀective
labor for Firm i is F i
1(Ei + E∗
i ,K i). Let Ki = K for all ￿rms so that ￿rms are
identical apart from their license allocations. Again, consider the two ￿rm case.
In Figure 3, the wage per eﬀe c t i v eu n i to fl a b o rf o re a c h￿r mi sg r a p h e do nt h e
vertical axis and the quota allocation is graphed on the horizontal axis where Q1
is the number of licenses allocated to Firm 1.
Assume both ￿rms are allocated the same number of licenses,
Q
2. As the license
allocation to Firm 1 increases, both ￿rms can initially adjust the mix of domestic
and foreign labor in order to use the same amount of eﬀective labor units. When
they hire the same number of eﬀective units of labor, the outcome is the same
as the transferable case. This will occur until Firm 1 hires only migrant labor.
Let the smallest quota allocation such that Firm 1 uses only migrant labor be
de￿ned as Q1 = Qh
1. Of course at this allocation, Firm 2 must be using all of the
domestic labor in the economy as well as some migrant workers. For
Q
2 ≤ Q1 <Q h
1,
both ￿rms hire the same average quality of workers, and use the same amount of
eﬀective labor.









2N∗]e q u a l st h ee ﬀective labor hired by Firm 1. While Firm 1 hires
only foreign labor (of the average quality), Firm 2 hires all the domestic labor as
well as the remaining foreign labor, and both hire the same total eﬀective labor.










1 and using the fact that [1 −
Q






As Q1 increases beyond Qh
1, ￿rms can hire the same amount of eﬀective labor by
hiring diﬀerent migrant labor types. This will be possible until Firm 1 is hiring the
lowest productivity type workers and Firm 2 is hiring the highest productivity type
workers. Denote the smallest quota allocation to Firm 1 such that Firm 1 uses only
the lower productivity type migrant workers as Q1 = QH
1 .F o rQh
1 <Q 1 ≤ QH
1 ,
Firm 1 uses only foreign labor. It has the same eﬀective labor as the other ￿rm
but uses lower quality foreign labor. At Q1 = QH
1 Firm 1 hires the lowest labor
types choosing to migrate and so cannot lower its average quality any further. Let
η(QH























1 where θ( ﬂ Q)i sd e ￿ned by (5).4





































Finally, for Q1 >Q H
1 , Firm 1 hires more eﬀective labor than Firm 2 and hence
has a lower marginal product of eﬀective labor, w1.
In such cases we say that the allocation of licenses is severely distorted. Since
Firm 2 employs both domestic and foreign workers, w2 is also the domestic wage
per eﬀective unit of labor and w2 >w 1. The allocations Qh
2 and QH
2 are symmet-
rically de￿ned and depicted in Figure 3.
T h ew a g es c h e d u l e so ﬀered to migrant workers when ￿rms have diﬀerent
marginal products of eﬀective labor, that is, when Q1 >Q H
1 , are represented
in Figure 4. In a competitive equilibrium each ￿rm must still be indiﬀerent be-
tween all of the labor types that it hires. Hence, (2) still holds for each ￿rm
though if they oﬀer diﬀerent wages, they attract diﬀerent workers so that
Wi(θ)=wiθ − Li. (12)
Since w2 >w 1,L 2 must be more than L1 for Firm 1 to attract any foreign workers.
Since higher quality workers value a higher w more than do lower quality ones,
Firm 2 attracts the highest worker types and Li is determined to ensure that
the number of migrant workers in each ￿rm equals its license allocation. Let θ2
denote the marginal worker hired by Firm 2 and recall that θ denotes the marginal
which implicitly de￿nes η(QH
1 ), while (11)g i v e s
QH
1 = N∗[η(QH
1 ) − θ( ﬂ Q)].
11migrant worker in the domestic economy. The number of workers between θ and
θ2 must equal Q1 and L1 must be such that it shifts the θw1 line down to go
through the point (θ,w∗θ) , while L2 must be such that it shifts the θw2 line
down to go through the point (θ2,w 1θ2 − L1). Note that the worker of type θ2 is
indiﬀerent between working for either ￿rm.
With θ distributed uniformly, θ2 =1−
Q2
N∗ and these conditions boil down to
w2θ2 − L2 = w1θ2 − L1 (13)
and
w1θ − L1 = w
∗θ. (14)
Thus:
L1 =[ w1 − w
∗][1 −
Q
N∗]( 1 5 )
and
L2 =[ w2 − w1][1 −
Q2




As the total eﬀective labor from abroad is unchanged from the transferable case, if
w2 >w 1 then Firm 1 hires more eﬀective labor than it did under transferability
while Firm 2 hires less. Hence w2 >w>w 1 so that domestic eﬀective labor which
earns w2 is better oﬀ.
What are the eﬀects of a skewed allocation of non-transferable licenses on
the distribution of license rents? Since w2 >w>w 1 and both w1θ − L1 and
wθ −L emanate from the point (θ,w θ −L)i nF i g u r e4 ,i ti sc l e a rt h a tt h ew a g e s
of low quality migrant workers must be lower under non-transferability when the
allocation of licenses is severely distorted. However, it is not clear that the migrant
workers types hired by Firm 2 must earn less.
With transferable licenses, from (3) and (5), the wage schedule oﬀered to






N∗]( 1 7 )
where wT is the marginal product of eﬀective labor when both ￿rms use the same
amount of eﬀective labor. Using equations (12) and (16), Firm 2￿s wage schedule
is
W2(θ)=w2θ − [w2 − w1][1 −
Q2




12Comparing (17) and (18), each migrant worker type hired by Firm 2 will make
less under non-transferability if
[w
T − w1]Q1 + N
∗[w
T − w2][1 − θ] > [w2 − w
T]Q2. (19)
If this condition holds for the highest type worker, θ =1 , then clearly it will also
hold for all worker types hired by Firm 2. For θ = 1, Equation (19) simpli￿es to
[w
T − w1]Q1 > [w2 − w
T]Q2.
In Figure 3, area A is [wT − w1]Q1 and area B is [w2 − wT]Q2. So the condition
h o l d sa sl o n ga sA is greater than B.
When might this be true? Notice that at Q1 = QH
1 ,a r e a sA and B disappear.
As we just start to increase the quota allocation to Firm 1 from Q1 = QH
1 ,a r e a
A is looks like it has to exceed than area B since Firm 1 has a larger allocation of
quota licenses. This suggests that for license allocations close to Q1 = QH
1 ,m i g r a n t
workers hired by both ￿rms will make less under non-transferability. Moreover,
this remains true for all Q1 >Q H
1 with a Cobb-Douglas production function. We
show this formally below.
Theorem 1 When licenses are non-transferable and all ￿rms do not have the
same marginal product of eﬀective labor the following will be true:
(1) All migrant workers hired by the ￿rm with the largest allocation of licenses
will receive lower wages than when licenses are transferable,
(2) With two ￿rms and g(.) uniform, workers hired by the ￿rm with the smaller
allocation of licenses will also earn less for all Q1 ∈ (QH
1 ,Q H
1 + A)f o rA small
enough.
(3) With two ￿rms and g(.) uniform, workers hired by the ￿rm with the smaller
allocation of licenses earn less for all Q1 ∈ (QH
1 , ﬂ Q) if the production function for
both ￿rms takes a Cobb-Douglas form.
Proof. In the Appendix.
2.3. Many Firms
We now generalize these conditions to the M ￿rm case. Here there are two types
of ￿rms, type 1 and type 2, where we assume that, Q1, the license allocation to
each ￿rm of type 1 is greater than, Q2, the license allocation to each ￿rm of type
132. There are ￿M symmetric ￿rms of type 1 and [1−￿]M symmetric ￿rms of type
2, where ￿ denotes the proportion of ￿rms that are of type 1. Let Q equal the
total number of licenses in the domestic economy, where
Q = M[￿Q1 +[ 1− ￿]Q2]. (20)
A change in M implies that the number of ￿rms has changed but that the pro-
portion of ￿rms of each type remains constant. This implies that an increase in
M leads to a proportional decrease in Q1 and Q2, as the total number of licenses
in the economy is constant. A change in ￿ implies that the proportion of type 1
￿rms has changed but the number of ￿rms remains constant. From (20), with Q
￿xed, ￿Q1 +[ 1− ￿]Q2 must be constant. Keeping Q1 ￿xed, this implies that an
increase in ￿ must lead to a decrease in Q2,a sQ1 is assumed to be greater than
Q2.
How do M and ￿ aﬀect Qh
1 and QH
1 ?A g a i nQh
1 is the minimum allocation to
each ￿rm of type 1 such that it uses only migrant labor. As before, equating the
eﬀective labor used by a ￿rm of type 1, which is the number of licenses times the










Using the fact that [1 −
Q







1 is independent of ￿ and decreasing linearly in M. This is illustrated
in Figure 5, with 1
M graphed on the horizontal axis and Q1 graphed on the vertical
axis. Intuitively, the point at which ￿rms of type 1 can no longer trade oﬀ domestic
for migrant labor only depends on the number of licenses each type 1 ￿rm is
allocated. As the number of ￿rms increases, the allocation of licenses to each ￿rm
decreases. Thus, the point at which ￿rms of type 1 are no longer able to trade
oﬀ domestic for foreign labor occurs earlier and Qh
1 falls as M rises. However,
increasing the proportion of type 1 ￿rms, does not aﬀect Qh
1. This follows as we




1 ￿rms of type 1 use the lowest quality migrant workers,
but still have the same marginal product of migrant eﬀective labor as ￿rms of type
142. Formally, η(QH
1 )i sd e ￿ned by setting the eﬀective labor hired by all type 1
￿rms equal to each ￿rms￿ share of total eﬀective labor in the economy,
[E+E∗]
M ,















1 is de￿ned by setting the number of workers hired by all type 1 ￿rms, i.e. those
between θ and η(QH










From (22) we see that η(QH
1 ) is independent of M and increasing in ￿.T h i s
implies that the left hand side of (23) is ￿xed. As a result the product of QH
1 and
M must be constant when M changes so that QH
1 must be decreasing linearly in
M. This is illustrated in Figure 5, where QH
1 ( 1
M,￿) is greater than Qh
1( 1
M), when
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1 )i si n c r e a s i n gi n￿, QH
1 must be decreasing in ￿ f o rag i v e nn u m b e ro f
￿rms, M. This is drawn in Figure 5 where ￿<￿ 0.A ni n c r e a s ei n￿ rotates the
ray between 0 and QH
1 inward but does not aﬀect Qh
1.T h u s ,t h ei n t e r v a lQH
1 −Qh
1
decreases as ￿ increases. Since both Qh
1 and QH
1 decrease proportionally as the
number of ￿rms increases, QH
1 − Qh
1 will decrease as M increases. This implies
that if a given allocation, Q1, is initially below QH
1 ,i tm a ye n du pa b o v eQH
1 as
either M or ￿ rise.

















































Theorem 2 With many ￿rms using non-transferable licenses, and ￿rms not hav-
ing the same marginal product of eﬀective labor, the following will be true:
(1) All migrant workers hired by the ￿rm(s) with the largest allocation of
licenses will receive lower wages than when licenses are transferable,
(2) With g(.) uniform, and assuming the total licenses allocated to ￿rms of
type 1 is greater than the total licenses allocated to ￿rms of type 2, workers hired
by type 2 ￿rms will also earn less for all Q1 ∈ (QH
1 ,Q H
1 + A)f o rA small enough.
(3) With g(.) uniform, and assuming the total licenses allocated to ￿rms of
type 1 is greater than the total licenses allocated to ￿rms of type 2, workers hired
by type 2 ￿r m se a r nl e s sf o ra l lQ1 ∈ (QH
1 ,Q) if the production function for all
￿rms takes a Cobb-Douglas form.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Intuitively, part (1) holds as w1 <w T <w 2 when ￿rms do not have the
same marginal product of migrant eﬀective labor and Q1 >Q 2.P a r t( 2 )c a nb e
understood by noting that at QH
1 ,a l l￿rms have the same wage. If the license
allocation to all type 1 ￿rms is very small, then the decrease in their marginal
product of migrant eﬀective labor from an increase in Q1 implies only a small
shift down in the aggregate wage schedule, W(θ). Thus, migrant workers of type
θ =1 , will not earn less by being hired by ￿rms of type 2. Only when the total
license allocation to type 1 ￿rms is at least half of the total license allocation in
the economy will all workers hired by ￿rms of type 2 earn less. For part (3), the
16same condition applies. When the production function is Cobb-Douglas w1 falls
at a slower rate than w2 rises, as Q1 increases. A suﬃcient condition for workers
of type θ = 1 to earn less working for ￿rms of type 2 remains that the total license
allocation to ￿rms of type 1 be greater than the total license allocation to ￿rms
of type 2.
3. Imperfect Substitutes
In this section we ask whether our results go through when domestic and foreign
labor are imperfect substitutes. We show that the outcomes are similar. If a ￿rm
has more licenses than the other one, then for a while it will be able to hire the
same eﬀective foreign labor by hiring diﬀerent qualities of migrant labor. After a
point, namely when it is using the lowest quality migrant labor, it can no longer
do so and it hires more eﬀective foreign labor than the other ￿rm and has a lower
marginal product of foreign labor.
For simplicity, assume that all ￿rms are ex ante identical and have a production
function, F(E,E∗,K). Take the optimal choice of E for every given value of E∗,w
and K and denote it by E(E∗,w,K). This is implicitly de￿ned by
FE(E,E
∗,K)=w. (26)











If domestic and foreign labor are substitutes (complements), then an increase in E∗
shifts in (out) the marginal value product of E, resulting in a reduction (increase)
in the optimal choice of E so that E(E∗) is downward (upward) sloping. When



















































This is the demand for migrant eﬀective labor as a function of migrant eﬀective
labor, capital, and the domestic wage per eﬀective labor unit.
Assuming concavity of F(E,E∗,K),
gE∗E∗(.)=FE∗EEE∗ + FE∗E∗ < 0.
Now that we have a direct and indirect willingness to pay for E∗, or a demand
curve, we need to derive the supply side of the labor market. Let each ￿rm be
allocated Qi non-transferable licenses. To derive the supply schedule of migrant
eﬀective labor that ￿rms face we need to look at the relationship between the
equilibrium wage per eﬀective unit of labor received by migrant workers and the
eﬀective labor units supplied to each ￿rm.
We continue to use two ￿rms to illustrate this. As discussed in previous sec-





i is the equilibrium wage per eﬀective unit of migrant labor for each ￿rm
and Li is the transfer payment oﬀered to each ￿rm by a migrant worker. If Firm
1o ﬀers a wage per eﬀective unit of labor less than that of the rest of the world,
that is, w∗
1 ≤ w∗, they will not be able to hire any migrant workers from abroad.
In this range, the supply schedule for eﬀective labor is inelastic and equal to zero
as seen in Figure 6.
If Firm 1 oﬀers a wage per eﬀective unit of labor greater than w∗ the pro-
ductivity types and eﬀective migrant labor supplied to them depends on the wage












































19oﬀered by Firm 2. If Firm 2 oﬀers a higher wage, then only the lowest worker types
migrating choose to work for Firm 1 since high worker types value the higher wage
per eﬀective unit of labor more than low worker types. This is depicted in Figure
7 − a.T h u sf o rw∗
2 >w ∗
1 >w ∗, the supply of eﬀective labor for Firm 1 is vertical
at E∗1
low as depicted in Figure 6. If Firm 1 oﬀers a wage equal to that of Firm
2, it can certainly get a supply of E∗1
low if it hires only the lowest quality foreign
workers. However, if it hires the highest quality, and this is no problem as workers
are indiﬀerent between working for the two ￿rms, there is a discrete jump in the
eﬀective labor hired by Firm 1 and it can hire as many as E∗1
high units of foreign
eﬀective labor. Hence it faces a supply curve which is horizontal between E∗1
low
and E∗1
high.I nF i g u r e7 −b,f o ra n yw∗
1 >w ∗
2, the highest worker types that migrate
choose to work for Firm 1 and the supply of eﬀective labor is vertical at E∗1
high.
The bids oﬀered by migrant workers to both ￿rms adjust such that the marginal
worker hired by each ￿rm is indiﬀerent between working for that ￿rm and their
best alternative available.
We can go through a similar process to derive the supply schedule facing Firm
2. Note that an increase in the number of licenses shifts this supply curve to the
right. The intersection of the supply schedule, which depends on the allocation of
licenses, and the demand curve, which is common to all ￿rms, gives the shadow
price of a unit of E∗ o rt h ew a g ep e re ﬀective unit of migrant labor for each ￿rm
in equilibrium. Figure 6 depicts Firm 2 as having the smaller allocation of licenses
and thus a higher shadow price of a unit of E∗ where the supply schedule for Firm
2 is to the left of the supply schedule for Firm 1.








1 is the highest quota
license allocation for Firm 1 consistent with equal equilibrium wages, wT,f o rt h e
two ￿rms. This is depicted in Figure 8, where the quota allocation to Firm 1
is QH
1 . As Q1 increases, the supply schedule for Firm 1 shifts to the right and
the supply schedule for Firm 2 shifts to the left. A higher license allocation for
Firm 1 when Q1 >Q H
1 must result in a lower equilibrium wage oﬀered to migrant
workers by Firm 1 and a higher wage oﬀered by Firm 2 as illustrated in Figure
6. It is easy to see that the ￿rst two parts of Theorem 1 remain true even when
domestic and foreign labor are diﬀerentiated. Part (3) is shown in the Appendix
where migrant and foreign eﬀective labor now enter separately in the production
function.






























Wage per eﬀective unit
E∗ 0
4. Conclusion
Throughout this paper we have looked at how implementation of migration policies
can aﬀect both the allocation of worker types amongst ￿rms in the economy and
the eﬃciency of the economy as a whole. In particular, when licenses are non-
transferable and ￿rms do not have the same marginal product of eﬀective labor,
￿rms oﬀer diﬀerent wage schedules to migrant workers in equilibrium, there are
eﬃciency losses in the economy, and under certain conditions a greater share of
migration rents accrue to ￿rms. Similar results are obtained when domestic and
foreign labor inputs are not perfect substitutes and allocations of licenses are
unequal. This may be a reason why non-transferable migration licenses are used
in GCC countries where ￿rms have a considerable amount of political power.
5. Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 Part (1) follows as w1 <w T <w 2 for all Q1 ∈ (QH
1 , ﬂ Q).
F o rp a r t s( 2 )a n d( 3 )w en e e dt ot e s tw h e t h e ro rn o t[ wT − w1]Q1 − [w2 −
wT][Q − Q1] > 0. This condition becomes
w
TQ>w 1Q1 + w2Q2. (27)
Since the left hand side is constant, if we show that the right hand side of
(27) is decreasing in Q1 at QH
1 , we will have shown part (2). Let F i
1 be the
21marginal product of eﬀective labor for Firm i. Taking the derivative of both
sides, and evaluating it at Q1 = QH
























dQ1. Second, that at
Q1 = QH
1 , F 1
1 = F 2
1 and F 1
11 = F 2
11. Third, that Q1 − Q2 > 0. Fourth, that
F 1
11 < 0 by concavity. Last, that
dE∗
1
dQ1 > 0f o ra l lQ1 ∈ (QH
1 ,Q H
1 + A)f o rA








Since this is a strict inequality, (28) holds in a small region close to QH
1
which proves the second part of Theorem 1.
If we show that the right hand side of (27) is decreasing in Q1 at all Q1 ≥ QH
1







For Q1 >Q H
1 , (28) becomes

























dQ2 and w1 = F 1































































De￿ne φ = −
dlogq2
dlogQ2 and ψ =
dlogq1
dlogQ1.W h e nQ1 rises, worker quality rises for
Firm 1 and falls for Firm 2. Hence, both φ and ψ are non-negative. Using
the above in (29) gives us








[1 − φ]]. (30)
In the Cobb-Douglas case,
dlogw
dlogE∗ = α − 1
so that (30) becomes
w2 − w1 > [α − 1][w1[1 + ψ] − w2[1 − φ]]. (31)
Rearranging terms gives (31) to be
[w2 − w1]α > [α − 1][w1ψ + w2φ]].
The left hand side is positive when Q1 >Q H
1 since [w2 − w1] > 0i nt h i s
case. The right hand side is negative as α < 1. Hence, this inequality always
holds! This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2 Here let Q1 and Q2 be the number of licenses allocated to
each ￿rm of type 1 and type 2 respectively. If there are ￿M ￿rms of type
1a n d[ 1− ￿]M ￿rms of type 2 the total license allocation to ￿rms of type
1a n dt y p e2a r e￿MQ1 and [1 − ￿]MQ2.L e tQ equal the total number of
licenses in the domestic economy, where Q = M[￿Q1 +[ 1− ￿]Q2].
Part (1) holds by construction as w1 <w T <w 2 for all Q1 ∈ (QH
1 ,Q).
For parts (2) and (3), we again need to check whether all workers hired by
￿rms of type 2 earn less with non-transferable licenses for the conditions
stated above in Theorem 2. In the two ￿rm case this condition is given by
23W(θ) >W 2(θ), and if this holds for θ = 1 it will hold for all other migrant




∗]θ >w 2 − [w2 − w1]η(Q
H
1 ) − [w1 − w
∗]θ.
T h el o w e s tw o r k e rt y p e ,θ, is only a function of Q. A change in the total
number of ￿rms will not aﬀect the lowest worker type or η(QH
1 )a ss h o w n
earlier.
Thus, our condition becomes
w
T[1 − θ] >w 2[1 − η(Q
H
1 )] + w1[η(Q
H
1 ) − θ]. (32)
With a uniform distribution, the lowest migrant worker type is
θ =1−
Q
N∗.( 3 3 )
The highest migrant worker type hired by type 1 ￿rms equals the lowest
migrant worker type in the economy, θ, plus the number of workers hired by











Substituting (34) and (33) into (32) and multiplying both sides by N∗ gives
w
TQ>w 2[Q − ￿MQ1]+w1￿MQ1.( 3 5 )
Equation (35) can also be written as
[w
T − w1]￿MQ1 > [w2 − w
T][Q − ￿MQ1].
Intuitively, when Q1 >Q H
1 , all migrant workers hired by ￿rms of type 2
earn less under non-transferability if the total decrease in wages lost by
￿rms of type 1, [wT − w1]￿MQ1, is greater than the total gain in wages
for ￿rms of type 2, [w2 − wT][Q − ￿MQ1]. Since Q1 >Q 2 by assumption,

















ﬂ. When the production



















































dQ1.T h u s ,as u ﬃcient condition such that (35) holds is that the
number of licenses allocated to type 1 ￿rms must be greater than half of the





More formally, since the left hand side of (35) is constant, if the right hand
side of (35) is decreasing in Q1 at QH
1 +A, for a suﬃciently small A we will
have shown part (2). Let F i
1 be the marginal product of eﬀective labor for
Firm i. Taking the derivative of both sides, and evaluating it at Q1 = QH
1
g i v e su st h ec o n d i t i o n :






























1 = F 2
1 and F 1
11 = F 2
11 at Q1 = QH
1 .S i n c e
F 1
11 < 0b yc o n c a v i t y ,a n d
dE∗
1
dQ1 > 0 for all Q1 ∈ (QH
1 ,Q H
1 + A)f o rA small
enough, as expected, the right hand side of (36) is negative if ￿MQ1 >
Q
2
which is assumed to be true. This proves the second part of Theorem 2.
If we show that the right hand side of (35) is decreasing in Q1 at all Q1 ≥ QH
1








25For Q1 >Q H
1 , becomes

























dQ2 and w1 = F 1


































dividing both sides of (37) by ￿M,g i v e s































De￿ne φ = −
dlogq2
dlogQ2 and ψ =
dlogq1
dlogQ1.W h e nQ1 rises, worker quality rises for
Firm 1 and falls for Firm 2. Hence, both φ and ψ are non-negative. Using
the above in (38) gives us












26In the Cobb-Douglas case,
dlogw
dlogE∗ = α − 1
so that (39) becomes




Rearranging terms gives (40) to be
w2[1 − [α − 1]
[1 − ￿]
￿




The right hand side is negative as α < 1. Since w2 >w 1,t h er i g h th a n d
side will always be positive when















Again if ￿MQ1 >
Q
2,￿is minimized at Q = MQ1.T h i si m p l i e st h a t￿>1
2.
As such, the right hand side of (41) is always positive. Hence, this inequality
holds when the total license allocation to ￿rms of type 1 is greater than half
of the migration licenses in the economy. This completes the proof.
Imperfect Labor Substitutes With imperfect labor substitutes the Cobb-Douglas


































For Q1 >Q H









































































































































De￿ne φ = −
dlogq2
dlogQ2 and ψ =
dlogq1
dlogQ1.W h e nQ1 rises, worker quality rises for
Firm 1 and falls for Firm 2. Hence, both φ and ψ are non-negative. Using



















[1 − φ]]. (44)





















∗ =l o g [ α
g(E∗,K,w)
E∗ ]




















1[1 + ψ] − w
∗
2[1 − φ]]. (45)











− 1][w1ψ + w2φ]].
The left hand side is positive when Q1 >Q H
1 since [w∗
2−w∗
1] > 0a n d α
1−β > 0.
The right hand side is negative as [ α
1−β −1] < 0, since 1−α−β > 0. Hence,
this inequality always holds! This completes the proof.
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